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ARTICLES
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE
HEBRAIC FAITH
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
Justice shall redeem Zion and righteousness her repentant
people.
Isaiah 1:27
Judaism is the teaching that there is really only One Power
which, while at times it may permit the sham powers of the
world to accomplish something in opposition to it, never
permits such accomplishment to stand.
Martin Buber
A jurisprudence that has to do with the God of Jews and
Christians begins with the Bible, and particularly with the
covenant between God and His people. For example, Deuter-
onomy 5:6-7: "The Lord said, I am the Lord your God who
brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. You
shall have no other god to set against me."32 Faith in Israel's
Savior God is the measure of jurisprudence for Jews and
Christians. The God in whom we have faith is the God of the
Hebrews, Who tells us that He is one God (not to be divided),
and Who commands us to have no other god. This is a set of
limits on jurisprudence, a set of negative first principles; it
rejects any view of the law in which the law takes the place of
God. It means that, however we theorize about the place of
the law in God's Kingdom and in our lives as His people, we
reject all theories that leave us with two gods instead of one.
* B.A., Univ. Albuquerque, 1958; J.D., Univ. Notre Dame, 1961,
Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; former Dean, Notre
Dame Law School. I am grateful for the advice and assistance of Milner
Ball, Harlan Beckley, Samuel Calhoun, Stanley Hauerwas, John Heitkamp,
Louis Hodges, Lewis LaRue, Andrew McThenia, John Robinson, Robert
E. Rodes, Mary M. Shaffer, and Margaret Williams. I am grateful, too, to
those who have participated in the jurisprudence project of the Christian
Legal Society, who have read and reacted to my notions and allowed me to
read and react to theirs.
1. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER'S LIFE AND WORK 18 (1983).
2. All biblical citations refer to the New English version.
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I. No OTHER GOD
The major sources for what one might call Hebraic juris-
prudence agree that the law can become an idol, and that it
must not. Law, especially law as in the way lawyers talk about
it, is an awesome force and a value in itself. It is available for
idolatry. Not everything is available for idolatry; some things
tend to become idols and some things do not. It is unlikely
that people will make a god out of a potato, but the evidence
of history is that they may make a god out of the earth,
money, the state, or their notions of who God is. St. Paul dis-
tinguishes, in Colossians 3:5, between sexual sins and greed;
it is greed that he says "is nothing less than idolatry." Law is
more like the earth, or the state, or money, or theological
notions, than like a potato.
Judaism. In the Diaspora, in which Jews have lived in
Gentile nations, the unity of the Mosaic law is broken. The
ordinary civil law that binds a Jew, according to the Talmud,
is therefore the law of the nation he lives in; that municipal
law carries the force of Mosaic law,' with this exception-it
must not become a god: "Hebraic religion says no to society
whenever society, in its pride, makes claims to absoluteness
... .Personal self-realization in faith and love needs society
for its development, but it possesses a dimension and a goal
of which society knows nothing. Ultimately, man stands re-
lated to God and fellow-man in a bond which no society can
comprehend or social institution embody.""
Roman Catholicism. St. Thomas Aquinas is the almost offi-
cial Roman Catholic philosopher.' The Thomistic view of the
state is in many ways like that of the Greeks. Socrates said
that the duty he owed the state was the duty he owed his
parents - obedience even in the face of injustice.6 Aristotle
3. The Talmudic principle (from the third century C.E.) is: "The
law of the government is binding law." This, Herman Wouk says, "became
the basis for the civic loyalty of Jews outside the Holy Land. It gives to the
law of the lands where they dwell the full force of religious law." H. WOUK,
THIS Is My GOD: THE JEWISH WAY OF LIFE 301-302 (rev. Pocket Books ed.
1974).
4. W. HERBEAG, JUDAISM AND MODERN MAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF
JEWISH RELIGION 139 (Atheneum ed. 1980). 1 am using "Hebraic," as Her-
berg does, rather than the more conventional "Judeo-Christian." Her-
berg's usage better reflects the fact that we are talking about a common
tradition, not about similarities in separate traditions.
5. 1 R. MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 41-42 (1980).
6. PLATO, CRITO, 43a-54e.
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grounded his political theory on the virtue of friendship. 7
From Aristotle, Aquinas developed his theory of natural law,
and, to Aquinas, natural law was the measure of human law.
But both through natural-law theory and otherwise Aquinas
limited the authority of the state in a way which would have
been problematic for the Greeks. Sophocles's Antigone could
not, I think, have been a medieval Christian play.
"[T]he force of a law depends on the extent of its jus-
tice," Aquinas said. And justice is determined according to
reason. "But the first rule of reason is the law of nature
... .Consequently, every human law has just so much of
the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature." If
human law departs from the law of nature, he said, it is
"spoilt law." Perhaps it is still law in some way, but it is not
clear that it is the law in the sense that it must be obeyed. It
may be possible to accept an action of the state as law, and so
to honor it, but at the same time to refuse to obey it. Antigone
would, again, be a problematic case for medieval Christians.
On the question of obedience, Aquinas distinguishes be-
tween laws that are unjust because "contrary to human
good" and laws that are "contrary to God's rights," that is,
idolatrous. In the first category are laws that are inequitably
dispensed and laws that do not serve the common good. For
example, "when the ruler taxes his subjects rather for his
own greed or vanity than the common benefit." Following
Augustine, he said such laws are "outrages rather than laws,"
and do not bind conscience, "unless perhaps to avoid scandal
or riot."' That is a subtle proposition; the "unless perhaps"
suggests a substantial territory, and Aquinas no doubt real-
ized that it did. He cited Matthew 6:40 to support the "unless
perhaps": "If any one forces you to go one mile . . . and if
anyone should sue you . . ... ' But there is no "unless per-
haps" for human laws that are in the category "contrary to
God's rights." These, Aquinas said, "are the laws of tyrants
which promote idolatry . . . .To observe them is in no wise
permissible, for . ..We must obey God rather than men." 10
This position is in Reformation Protestant writers as
well, although among Protestants the position is more elabo-
7. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk VIII: 1155a1-1 163b27 &
Bk IX: 1163b30-1172al5.
8. AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Prima Secundae, q. 95 a. 2 (Pegis
ed. 1948).
9. I quote, here, the New English Bible translation of Matt. 6:40.
10. Id. at a. 4 (citing Acts 5:25).
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rately biblical and is not always related to the law of nature.1
There are a couple of other opportunities for jurisprudential
discussion in these Judaic and Roman Catholic sources that
are not so prominent in Protestant theology. One point of
emphasis is that the Jewish and Thomistic traditions reflect a
relatively positive view of what a human being is. Herberg's
generalization of the reason for a limit on the moral duty to
obey Gentile civil law, for example, turns on Israel's belief
that man's relation with God is "a bond which no society can
comprehend." Robert E. Rodes, a modern, Roman Catholic,
natural law thinker, makes the same point, and suggests as
well the Thomistic view that tyrannical government is more
objectionable, because idolatrous, than unfair government,
when he says: "Human authority stands between a God
whose ultimate purposes are inscrutable, and a human being
whose ultimate being is impenetrable; anyone who makes it a
basis for intervening in the affairs of his fellows should do so
with humility and reverence."'" This sentiment once found
its way into the pages of the United States Reports. Justice
James Wilson, an eighteenth century, natural law thinker,
said in a 1792 tax case: "Man, fearfully and wonderfully
made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator: A State,
useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contri-
vance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its ac-
quired importance . . . . A state, I cheerfully admit, is the
noblest work of Man: But, Man himself, free and honest, is, I
speak as to this world, the noblest work of God."'11
A second point of emphasis is the view that Jewish and
Thomistic traditions take of what law is. The concept is inevi-
tably ambiguous in Judaism, which takes its tradition from
the Torah, the Wisdom of God, a system of divinely ordained
law that affects all of human life - government and its oper-
ations; legal and moral duties among the Children of Israel;
obligations to Gentiles; matters of personal morality such as
diet, labor, and sexual behavior; and religious ritual. All of
these are law. Indeed, the moral force of civil law in a Gentile
nation depends on the civil law's participation in the divine
authority which gave Israel the Torah. Aquinas makes elabo-
rate distinctions among divine law, natural law, and man-
made law, but he uses the word "law" throughout his discus-
11. 0. CULLMAN, THE STATE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 37 (1956);
Dowey, Law in Luther and Calvin, 41 THEOLOGY TODAY 146 (1984).
12. R. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 4 (1976).
13. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 455, 462-63 (1792).
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sion. Although some Thomists disagree on this point,
Aguinas probably uses "law" even to refer to the sort of
"spoilt law" that does nor conform to the natural law re-
quirement that human law promote the common good.
There is a modern jurisprudential difficulty in the fact
that these traditions did not pursue jurisprudence as a dis-
crete inquiry. Neither tradition developed a philosophy of
law, a view of what law is in the modern lawyer's sense, and
of the sources and extent of its authority, until after the En-
lightenment. 14 Jurisprudence as a discipline begins in the
eigtheenth and nineteenth centuries, among Kantian and
utilitarian thinkers who were interested in distinguishing be-
tween law and morals; modern Jewish and Roman Catholic
jurisprudence, narrowly so called, is a response to those
thinkers. One way to suggest the agenda I mean to raise here
is to ask whether laws in either of Thomas's categories of im-
propriety - those "contrary to human good" and those
"contrary to God's rights" - are nonetheless laws. The
question that hides behind that question is why one would
want to ask whether such improper laws are nonetheless laws.
Aquinas's response to the hidden question is that prudence
may require obedience to spoilt law, but that faith requires
disobedience and maybe even defiance of idolatrous law.
Thus spoilt law (applying the term to laws contrary to human
good) is, in important ways, nonetheless law, but faith re-
quires disobedience and maybe even defiance of idolatrous
law. Aquinas's treatment is faithful to the Scholastic injunc-
tion - seldom affirm, never deny, always distinguish.1
Lutheran Protestantism. The next logical (or at least
chronological) inquiry is the position of the German Refor-
mation on the fundamental Hebraic propositions that the law
must not become an idol and that one's theory for avoiding
idolatry must not divide God in two: The Lord our God is
one, and we are to have no other god.
Martin Luther seems to me to have rejected, by and
large, the notion of conscientious disobedience that is allowed
for in Aquinas's theory of laws contrary to human good, and
that is commanded in Aquinas's theory of laws contrary to
the rights of God. Both Luther and Aquinas took Romans
13:1-6 into account, but Luther followed the Pauline passage
with more vehemence than Thomas did. The commands of
14. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUST OF ITsELF 78-84 (Beacon ed.
1960).
15. AQUINAS, supra note 8, a. 4.
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civil authority are the commands of God, Paul and Luther
say. Obedience is commanded, even obedience to the tyrant.
The civil authority St. Paul and his first readers knew about
was Roman civil authority; it was on the way to becoming the
civil authority of Caligula and Nero. Obedience to such ty-
rants does not risk idolatry, though, because the tyrants' au-
thority comes from God.
Every person must submit to the supreme authorities.
There is no authority but by act of God, and the existing
authorities are instituted by him; consequently anyone who
rebels against authority is resisting a divine institution, and
those who so resist have themselves to thank for the punish-
ment they will receive. For government, a terror to crime,
has no terrors for good behaviour. You wish to have no
fear of the authorities? Then continue to do right and you
will have their approval, for they are God's agents working
for your good. But if you are doing wrong, then you will
have cause to fear them; it is not for nothing that they hold
the power of the sword, for they are God's agents of pun-
ishment, for retribution on the offender. That is why you
are obliged to submit. It is an obligation imposed not
merely by fear of retribution but by conscience. That is also
why you pay taxes. The authorities are in God's service and
to these duties they devote their energies."
Does this mean that God's authority stands behind the ty-
rant? Even behind the tyrant's claim to be a god, which would
be a law "contrary to the rights of God" in Aquinas's system?
By and large, it seems to me, Martin Luther answered yes to
that question. In affirming the Pauline doctrine that the voice
of the tyrant is the voice of God, Luther sets the just God of
the Hebrews apart from the God who acts through tyrants;
he sets the holy God of Sinai apart from the merciful God of
the Psalms and of John 3:16 (" . . . God so loved the world
. . . . "). This is a major subject in Lutheran theology, usu-
ally treated under Luther's theory of the tension between law
and Gospel, and his consequent political theology of the two
kingdoms. It needs to be taken up separately; it is important
for theological jurisprudence. But, for present purposes, it is
sufficient to notice that Luther almost avoided the traditional
doctrine of Judaism and Thomism, that the moral duty to
obey the law is limited by the primal command of the God of
the Hebrews that His people have no other god.
16. Romans 13:1-6.
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Almost. Both Luther and modern Lutheran theologians
substantially alter this separation of the holy God from the
merciful God by noticing that the Kingdom of Love, the Gos-
pel side of the law-Gospel tension, influences the Kingdom of
the Law. Luther himself commanded the Christian prince,
who, Luther said, had all of the legitimate authority sug-
gested in Romans 13:1-6, to exercise his authority as a Chris-
tian, as one who lives in the Kingdom of Love while he pre-
sides over the Kingdom of the Law. Love affects law, law
cannot affect love; the bridge of influence is a one-way
bridge. 1
This Lutheran notion of influence suggests a way (a dis-
tinctly Protestant way, I think) in which loveless law can be
found not to be law, or not to be valid law, or at least not to
be the law that St. Paul had in mind in Romans 13:1-6. That
possibility, in any case, raises the question of how we are to
understand what Paul wrote in Romans 13:1-6. One way to
explore Luther, and a way to assess his view of the moral
duty to obey law, and therefore his view of what lawyer's law
is, is to ask what St. Paul was up to. We could do that with
the words themselves, which suggest that St. Paul was not
thinking of unjust law, or at least not of idolatrous law ("gov-
ernment has no terrors for good behaviour"). We could do it,
as some twentieth century Protestant scholars have, with a bit
of history and context; we could look into the arguments of
those 8 who say that Romans 13:1-6 was written in the fear
that Roman authority would think the Jewish Christians in
Rome were like the Zealots in Jerusalem. On this view, St.
Paul was warning the Christians, and probably the Roman
Jews too, not to fall in with violent revolutionaries and ter-
rorists, and maybe he overstated his point a bit.
Or maybe, to take another school of thought on Pauline
literature, St. Paul was still of the opinion that the Second
Coming of Jesus was imminent. He was giving directions for
a temporary civilian life in Rome and not laying down a social
ethic that he expected to be around to interest Martin Lu-
17. M. LUTHER, Secular Authority: To What Extent Should It Be Obeyed?
in MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS (J. Dillinberger ed.
1961); and in 3 WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 228-73 U. Schindel trans.
1930). See G. EBELING, LUTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT (R. Wil-
son trans. 1977); Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL U. L.
REv. 1 (1983); but see Professor Dale G. Lasky's (partial) disagreement,
Lasky, Is One Ethic Enough, id. at 41.
18. See, e.g., 0. CULLMAN, supra note 11, at 56-65.
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ther 1500 years later.1
Or we could try still another tack and suggest that the
central message of Jesus - peace, love of enemies, forgive-
ness - must always be the measuring stick in interpreting
the New Testament. Jesus is the New Torah for Paul. Paul
cannot have meant, therefore, that the tyrant must be obeyed
if the tyrant commands that a Christian kill or exploit an-
other person, or, especially, when the tyrant claims God's
place in a Jewish or Christian life.' 0 "You were bought at a
price; do not become slaves of men."'" A parallel and related
doctrine of interpretation in rabbinical literature understands
the Torah in reference to God's purpose in creating man and
in choosing Israel as His people. Moses Maimonides held, for
example, that "the ritual law is made for man and not man
for the ritual law," so that even clear law should be abro-
gated "in order to bring back the multitudes to religion."""
Anything people are serious about can become an idol; even
the community's worship can become an idol."
If these reflections have any validity, if the question of
idolatry can be focused on the issue of the moral duty to obey
civil law, the Lutheran tradition puts those who want to dis-
cuss theological jurisprudence to a choice: Either we must
look more deeply into Luther's teaching that law and Gospel
are in tension, or we must disagree with the vehement read-
ing of Romans 13:1-6 that we find in his essay on secular
authority.
In either case, when the question is put in terms not of
the subject's duty, but of the prince's, the difficulty disappears.
Luther's position was here more consistent with the Jewish
and Thomistic positions. Luther was forceful (as always) in
telling the state that it must not arrogate to itself the prerog-
atives of the church. The issue of a prince or a modern col-
lectivity claiming idolatrous respect is one thing; the issue of
whether the idol must be obeyed is another. Luther did not
suppose that the Christian would receive his salvation or his
19. N. PERRIN & D. DULING, THE NEW TESTAMENT: AN INTRODUCTION
203 (2d ed. 1982).
20. W. NEIL, HARPER'S BIBLE COMMENTARY 453,(1975); Gooch, Au-
thority and Justification in Theological Ethics: A Study in I Corinthians 7, 11
JOURNAL OF RELIGIous ETHics 62 (1983); W. DAVIES, PAUL AND RABBINIC
JUDAISM ch. 7 (4th ed. 1980).
21. 1 Corinthians 7:23.
22. Quoted and discussed in I. EPSTEIN, JUDAISM 255 (1959).
23. See K. BARTH, ETHics 319-27 (G. Bromiley trans. 1981). Barth
argues that even the concept of God can become an idol.
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well-being from the government. "It pleases the divine will
that we should call his executioners noble lords, fall at their
feet, and be subject to them with all humility," Luther said,
"as long as they do not extend their task too far and seek to
become shepherds instead of executioners."'" One may have
to obey the tyrant with his hands, but he cannot obey the
tyrant with his heart.Luther was also clear on how those who serve in govern-
ment should behave. The difficulty is in St. Paul's and Lu-
ther's moral counsel on obedience with the hands to those
who are subject to the government. Luther's disagreement
with Thomism and Judaism on that score goes to his law-Gos-
pel doctrine, which finally has to do not so much with idola-
try as with dividing God in two. Part II of this essay has more
to say about both parts of this issue in Lutheranism - that is
about both the prince's jurisprudence and the subject's.
Reform Protestantism. John Calvin and those who stand in
the Calvinist tradition have much of value to say on the law-
Gospel question; but, I think, Calvinists seriously disagree
with the Lutheran tradition on the present questions of law
as idol and dividing God in two. Karl Barth, in this regard a
careful Calvinist, disobeyed, rejected, and fled from German
National Socialism, not because it was tyrannical but because
it was idolatrous; it put the state where God ought to be; it
proposed to replace the church. It was radically evil because
of that claim - and this quite aside from what it did. On this
basis, if no other, Barth disobeyed with his hands; he took off
his preacher's robe and put on a military uniform." He was
prepared to go to war against the false god. Barth's teaching
here - which is, I think, faithful to the reformed-church tra-
dition - goes beyond the issue of idolatry: He would also say
that the state learns what to do, even what it is, from the
church. The church knows better than the state what the ori-
gin and purpose of the state are."6
Sectarian Protestantism. The Anabaptist tradition implaca-
bly insists on measuring what the government does by the
Gospel. A believer may pay Caesar the taxes Caesar demands
because God says he must, but he will not follow Caesar into
war or, for that matter, even into technology. Sectarian
thought in this regard rests on the nature of authority in the
24. M. LUTHER, supra note 1'7.
25. E. BUSCH, KARL BARTH: HIs LIFE FRoM LETrERS AND AUTOBIO-
GRAPHICAL TEXTS J. Bowden trans. 1976).
26. K. BARTH, COMMUNITY, STATE, AND CHURCH (1968).
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believer's life; it becomes wary of law at that point and there-
fore does not often reach the question of the state as an
idol. 7
Modern Idolatry. We Jews and Christians do believe,
though, that we should respect civil authority, and both the
Talmudic and Pauline traditions support us in that belief.
Jews and Christians are good citizens, and our reservation
that creature not pretend to be Creator, that we must obey
God rather than men, is not a daily problem for those of us
who live in modern Western democracies. We are secure in
the assumption that our political theory has solved that prob-
lem. In our security lies our self deception. The self deception
causes us to make an idol not so much of the state as of the
notion of civic virtue. We forget that even virtue is good only
until it becomes a god. Even the highest of the virtues, love
itself, can become an idol, and often does in modern theolog-
ical ethics.2 8 The danger for us is not that we build altars to
the state, or to the law in the lawyer's sense of law, but that
we come not to notice that the altars are already in place.2
We Americans tend to identify the authority of God with
civil authority. We have powerful historical precedent and
authority for doing so - the early-modern European notion
that the sovereign reigns by divine right, for example, or the
Pauline and Protestant notion that God established the state
(civil law) in order to curb our appetites and punish us for
our sins. "They are God's agents of punishment," Paul said.
"Frogs need storks," Luther said. Law is "like a whip to an
idle and balky ass," Calvin said." It is possible to go from
those relatively monarchical orientations to an orientation
that says the government's error is God's business, not ours.
(If the government's error is our business, the issue is politi-
cal, not moral.) We are not able to distinguish, then, between
the civil obedience that honors God and the civil obedience
27. Finger, The Problem of Law During the Protestant Reformation, in
THE BILE AND THE LAW 65, 85 (Occasional Papers No. 3, Institute of Men-
nonite Studies, n.d.).
28. Moral theory on self-deception is developed with clarity in H.
FiNGARETTE, SEr DECEPTON (1960). Fingarette's theory is given a focus in
social ethics, and therefore in notions of civic virtue, in S. HAUERWAS,
TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 82-98 (1977).
29. M. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE (1970). Marty discusses such ex-
amples as Thomas Jefferson's referenCe to the United States as "God's
New Israel."
30. All quoted or discussed or both in Alexander, Validity and Func-
tion of Law: The Reformation Doctrine of Usus Legis," 31 MERCER L. REV. 509(1980).
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that betrays the Hebraic ideal of love of neighbor. This point
is particularly important in the modern political theology that
builds on the radical Hebraic bias for the poor and oppressed
(of which more later).
In modern Western democracy, we only seem to have
found a way to avoid statism. Eighteenth century views of
natural law such as James Wilson's, which were for the most
part Hebraic theories, seem to have delivered us from six-
teenth century Lutheran views of civil authority and from the
divine right of kings. These modern political theories say that
God acts less through the prince than through the people,
who empower the prince because they are empowered by
God. But these theories tend to make an idol of the people,
that is, of the majority of those whom bias and entropy and
civil authority have made prosperous and powerful.
The view that the voice of such a majority is the law
that each of us citizens has made a primordial contract sur-
rendering his autonomy to majoritarian government - re-
places idolatry of the prince with idolatry of the town meet-
ing: Vox populi, vox Dei. That drift needs always Justice
Wilson's corrective: Although man made the (democratic)
state, God makes man. One helpful version of that corrective
is to understand law not as command but as dialogue: God, who
makes each person and gives him inalienable personal rights
and a political authority he can exercise collectively, gives
him as well a legal capacity that he exercises in conversation
with others. Law is the conversation. As Robert E. Rodes
puts it: "Man makes two all but universal claims upon law.
One is to vindication against unjust force; the other is to ru-
dimentary conditions of life. These seem to correspond to
God's earliest promises in Genesis: to go on ruling the world,
and to let man live . . . ."" Law as conversation is a correc-
tive for statism (that is, for idolatry), because it is more mod-
est than law as temple. Maybe that's because in conversation
we are better able to remember that both the Cross and
Buchenwald are symbols of what men do to one another in
the name of the law.
The view that law is a conversation provides a corrective
as well for the more specific and powerful drift toward demo-
cratic idolatry among modern American lawyers. Democratic
idolatry's most imposing professional monument is the adver-
sary ethic - the notion that a lawyer has a license to be im-
moral, because the democratic state needs him to do his duty
31. R. RODES, supra note 12, at 4.
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in an adversary system of, as we call it, justice. Law as conver-
sation is also a corrective to a less serious, but no less subtle,
idolatry in the natural law tradition. When natural law mea-
sures positive law, natural law is likely to take theform of pos-
itive law. How else are the two to be compared? This way of
thinking tends toward codifications of natural law - state-
ments of it in hornbook form. And, of course, hornbooks and
codes have authors; they have institutional authorities who
promulgate and enforce them. And the institutional author-
ity that stands behind these codifications of natural law can
become a god. There are examples of this in Anglo-Ameri-
can common law of the Blackstone variety and in Roman
Catholic moral theology.
II. DIVIDING GOD IN Two
The God of Israel and (therefore) of Jesus is one God
and we are to have no other god. Part I considered the impli-
cations for jurisprudence of the command to have no other
god (e.g., Deuteronomy 5:6-7). This part will consider the im-
plications of the doctrine that our God is one.
The problem with the central requirement that God is
one, particularly for jurisprudence, is that our God is not an
Aristotelian Prime Mover or deistic Supreme Being; He is a
Person, a Lover of mankind, and the Redeemer. A persistent
question in Hebraic theologies is: How can He be all of these
things at once? The tradition poses the question in a variety
of ways.
Example: In the principal work of Jewish mysticism, the
medieval Zohar, God as omniscient and omnipotent (En So])
is separated from God as present in the world (Shechinah).
The Shechinah, the Spirit of God, has been separated and is
in the world as a consequence of the Fall. The Shechinah is
in exile; the ultimate moral task for people is to reunite the
divided God, to restore the Shechinah; people do this
through lives of piety and moral excellence." Isn't this an
image of two gods rather than one?
Example: The Hebraic traditions consistently celebrate
the mercy of God, but they must also take God's holiness into
account. The unity of holiness and mercy in God is central to
32. 1. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 238. Buber defines the Shechinah as
"the Presence of God; sometimes used as a synonym for God. A rather old
rabbinic statement speaks, poetically, of the Shechinah having accompanied
Israel into exile." M. BuBER, FOR THE SAKE OF HEAVEN 315-16 (L. Lewisohn
trans. 2d ed. 1953). See W. DAvIEs, supra note 20, at 213-14.
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St. Paul's explanation of the Christian doctrine of redemp-
tion: "For all alike have sinned, and are deprived of the divine
splendour, and all are justified by God's free grace alone
... ,"89 God's holiness, offended by sinful mankind, is satis-
fied by God Himself. God in His mercy struggles with and
overcomes God in His holiness: "God overcomes himself, and
His love saves us from the threat of His holiness."" It is the
same God Who in holiness deprives man of splendor, and in
love justifies man and restores him to splendor. But how can
one God pursue two such different purposes?
Example: This question about the unity of God appears
even in the doctrine of creation. Buber asks, "[W]hy has the
limitless Godhead become the limited God, wandering
through the worlds and performing the work of creation in
His limitedness . . .? Why has the limitless Godhead, from
being an absolute Person, whom nothing stands over against,
become one faced by a recipient?""M How can God be the
Creator of the Universe and a Person - a loving Father -
as well? Buber's answer is to attribute love to the infinite
Godhead. God wanders in the world because of His kindness.
He becomes a God faced by a recipient "from longing for the
recipient upon whom It, the Godhead, could bestow its light.
Both answers are one. The actuality of God's way is to be
understood from the actuality of His will to show love.""
Not everyone has resolved this division of God into Creator
and Companion so clearly. The Hebraic tradition seems often
to have come up with solutions that involve two gods, a ten-
dency that has importance for jurisprudence.
A. Modern Mainline Theology
The Hebraic tradition poses the question in these ways,
and many others, but it has finally refused any answer that
weakens the doctrine of the unity of the One God. At one
extreme, the Christian tradition has rejected docetism in all
its forms. Jesus Christ was not a ghostly appearance; he did
not merely seem to be a man.87 The early Christian church
thought it essential to the Christian doctrine of salvation to
33. Romans 3:23 (emphasis added).
34. 1 H. THIELICKE, THEOLOGICAL Emdics 117-20 (W. Lazareth trans.
1960).
35. M. BUBER, THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF HASIDISM 196 (M. Fried-
man trans. 1966).
36. Id.
37. "Docetism" comes from the Greek dokein, "to seem."
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insist that Jesus was fully human and fully divine. "True God
of true God," as the Nicene Creed put it, in 325 C.E. At the
other extreme, the early church condemned as heresy the
first century doctrine of Marcion that the Christ was a differ-
ent God than the Father, that the Christ was the God of
mercy and the Father was the God of holiness."
One Jewish parallel is the doctrine of Benjamin
Nahavendi, one of the early medieval Karaites, who rejected
the Talmud. Nahavendi held that God was, as Epstein puts it,
"too transcendental to mingle with the material world and
that it was an angel who created the world and not God him-
self."" The Jewish tradition has rejected that notion as
clearly as it has rejected Philo's notion that the Logos, the
word of God, was a second and inferior god and the instru-
ment of creation. 0 "In Judaism," Epstein says, "the God of
Justice is the God of Mercy (Love), one and inseparable, both
Justice and Mercy being but complimentary aspects of God's
character as exhibited in His moral government of the world
and His particular providence.14' The same is true in Christi-
anity, which nonetheless asks, as Judaism obviously does:
"How can this be?"
The importance of this question for jurisprudence is:
How is the Kingdom of God involved in what lawyers call
law? Is God working through lawyer's law, or is one who sees
the best and highest good of the human person in Hebraic,
transcendent terms wasting his time to work through lawyer's
law for a better world? "There is really only One Power," as
Buber put it.4' Maybe, to use an image Thielicke adapts from
Luther, the law is gauze in a wound that only the Gospel can
cure?"3 Is the Gospel a source of law, as the Torah is, or, to
look at that question the other way around, is God present in
the world in such a way that the world and the world's law
are sources of grace? Is it possible that the state itself is a
source of grace, "God's agents working for your good," as St.
Paul says? Maybe, as in Barth's phrase, there is a blessing in
38. J. PELIKAN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CATHOuC TRADITION 74-76(1971).
39. I. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 188-89.
40. Id. at 197-98.
41. Id. at 135-36.
42. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 18. In the Protestant tradition
this issue is often focused on the doctrine of God's "third use" of the law,
on the law as a source of virtue. See Alexander, supra note 30; Dowey,
supra note 11.
43. 1 H. THIELICKE, supra note 34.
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Martin Luther posed his answer in characteristically
straight-forward terms: Law and Gospel are united in the
mind of God, but nowhere else. In the world and in human
life, they are irreconcilably separate. They are in tension, and
we people stand in the field of their tension. Luther doubtless
came to the doctrine from an old theological tradition going
back at least as far as St. Augustine and from his reading of
scripture. The doctrine happened, in any case, to solve sev-
eral problems for him. One was the contradiction between
God's moral commandments and the Pauline doctrine that
salvation is God's free gift-His unconditional gift, as Luther
saw it.45 Luther decided, of course, that obedience to the law
is not a condition for salvation; therefore, law is separate from
Gospel. The promises of the Gospel are not conditioned on
observance of the law.
Another Lutheran position concerns the demanding, if
not impossible, morality stated in the teachings of
Jesus-love of enemies, servanthood, turning the other
cheek, etc. These seem to be unreasonable for life in a world
of rivalry, bureaucracy, war, and commerce. Luther found
unacceptable the medieval notion that the Sermon on the
Mount contains "counsels of perfection" and not moral com-
mands, because it led to the development of elites among be-
lievers. If, though, each of us lives in two kingdoms, a
worldly kingdom (the law) and a kingdom of faith, hope, and
love (Gospel), we can differentiate the moral demands put on
us; we can satisfy the demands of the world - legal demands
- according to the morals of natural reason, and we can sat-
isfy the demands of the Gospel - belief - as Luther put it,
"in our faith and in our books." 46
Luther's doctrine of the separation of law and Gospel is
complex. It may be too simple to explain it from the perspec-
tive of problems it solved for Luther (the two I have men-
tioned and, no doubt, others), but that is, at least part of the
time, the way the Lutherans do it. Helmut Thielicke, for ex-
ample, insists that the alternative to Luther's doctrine is a
point of view that reduces Christian morals to sentiment and
44. K. BARTH, THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN 303 (D.
Horton trans. 1978).
45. M. LUTHER, supra note 17; 1 H. THIELICKE, supra note 34.
46. My two-kingdoms essay discusses these teachings in some detail,
with references to Luther's treatment of them and modern discussions by
Lutheran scholars. Shaffer, supra note 17.
1984]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
optimism. The tension between law and Gospel is "the only
guarantee that in theological reflection the historicity of rev-
elation will be preserved. If this tension were to be done away
with, theology would be taken over by a timeless, monistic
principle such as the idea of love or the idea of divine good-
ness. Instead of being an exigesis of salvation's history, theol-
ogy would be changed into an optimistic-Christian philosophy
or world view. '
Thielicke argues that the tension is necessary for the
preservation of the notion that the Incarnation is an event in
history, that the Incarnation is the place and the time where
the loving God struggled with the holy God and won. Be-
cause of that historic event, the law and the Gospel were and
are apart and qualitatively different. They have different
points of origin. The implication is that institutional forms of
life in secular society and among the faithful are also differ-
ent, and even that they operate on different moralities.
The Lutheran notion of separation has arrayed against it
the Judaic, Roman Catholic, and Calvinist traditions. Calvin's
theology generally shows the moral demands of the Hebrew
Bible and those of the New Testament as more of a whole
than Luther does. The Hebrew Bible and the Christian Bible
are not sequential for Calvin; they are concentric circles.
"There is indeed only one single and ongoing righteousness
of God," he said. Also, for Calvin, as for the Thomistic natu-
ral law tradition, the revelation of God (and particularly the
revelation of God as it might affect law in the lawyer's sense)
is both in nature and in the Bible, the one "engraven on tab-
lets of stone," the other "inscribed on the heart." Law, Gos-
pel, and nature are in a teleological unity; they point to a sin-
gle destiny for man, as to a single Kingdom of God; they are
one, in the oneness of God. God uses the law to convince be-
lievers that they are sinful, and to instruct them in how to
live, as well as to maintain order."
Calvin's reading of the Decalogue illustrates this teleo-
logical unity. He sees the Commandments, as Jews see all of
the Torah, as positive and not merely prohibitive. For Calvin,
the command not to steal is a command to practice charity; as
in rabbinical teaching. God's response to His child's having
47. 1 H. THIELICKE, supra note 34, at 106.
48. J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 349-410
(Westminster ed. 1960); discussed in Finger, supra note 27, at 75-83; and in
Alexander, supra note 30. See also 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; and
Dowey, supra note 11.
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obeyed a commandment is to give the child another com-
mandment.49 God's commandments are not only instruments
of judgment and terror; they also express His love. This em-
phasis is more dominant in Calvinist thinking than is the in-
sistence that the redemption was a mighty miracle performed
at a time and in a place in which God as love rescued man
from God as holy. Karl Barth expressed this tradition in his
theory that the command of God contains forgiveness for vi-
olation of the command; the command itself is a concentric
circle.80
So, too, Judaism: "Hebraic religion strikes an unmistaka-
bly this-worldly note: this world, the world in which we pass
our lives, the world in which history is enacted, the world of
time and change and confusion, is the world in which the di-
vine Will is operative and in which, however strange it may
seem, man encounters God."81 Jewish mysticism describes all
of physical reality, each bit of it, as containing sparks of the
divine. "The holy in things. . . awaits the liberation and ful-
fillment of the man who gives himself completely . . . he ex-
ercises no power but a service, the service."" The poetic im-
age here is in the Kabbala and in the imagery of the
eighteenth century Eastern European Hasidic movement.
The divine sparks contain ethics, sacramental theology, and
the answer to the problem of evil.58 In Judaism, moral teach-
ing fastens on daily, worldly tasks as moral action; making a
shoe, in faithful service to neighbor, and loving God as the
shoe is made, is no less a holy act than prayer or even sacrifi-
cial alms-giving. "If you turn away from the world in order to
turn to God, you have not turned toward the reality of God
but only toward your concept of God, the isolated religious is
also in reality the not religious.""
The most coherent, modern Protestant view in opposi-
tion to the Lutheran theory of the tension between law and
Gospel is probably the Christian social ethic - the jurispru-
dence, I think - of Karl Barth. Reinhold Niebuhr once criti-
49. ETHICS OF THE FATHERS, cited in Owen & Mesch, Protestants,
Jews, and the Law, 101 THE CHRISTIAN CENTIURY 601, 603 (1984); see also
Dowey, supra note 11.
50. K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 91 (discussing 2 J. CALVIN, supra
note 48, at 7, 2).
51. W. HERBERG, supra note 4, at 49.
52. M. BUnER, supra note 35, at 151-52.
53. Id. at 83-84; I. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 244-45.
54. M. BUBER, supra note 35, at 235. Compare Barth's teaching on
the concept of God as an idol, K. BARTH, supra note 23.
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cized Barth for placing "the whole political process from be-
ginning to end under the order of redemption." That seems
to be a fair statement of Barth's position. Barth was uninter-
ested in that part of the natural law tradition that saw the
political order as a manifestation of human excellence, "the
noblest work of man" in Justice Wilson's phrase. Barth was a
consistent Calvinist; he accepted that the state is corrupt, as
are the men who maintain it. But he also rejected the Lu-
theran notion that the "order of preservation" (the Kingdom
of the Law) is separate from the "order of redemption" (the
Kingdom of Love). There is, for Barth, only one order -
the order of redemption. The grace of God operates in the
state and in the law as it operates throughout creation, and it
operates redemptively throughout. Finally, Barth does not re-
ject nature as law but sees nature as redeemed, so that there
is not a tension between nature and Gospel."
The consequence of this for Barth was that the position
of the believer in the state - the position of the lawyer prac-
ticing law -is the position of prophet. His place - and
Barth often expressed this as the place of the church, particu-
larly when he resisted the Nazis - is to teach the state what
he knows as a believer. Indeed, in Barth's view, the state gets
its justification from the church. And it is to be criticized by
believers in a specifically religious way. Thus Barth said (in
1938) that Nazi anti-Semitism demonstrated that the Nazi re-
gime sought to be a "basically anti-Christian counter-
church.""
"The really decisive Biblical-theological ground for this
assertion," he said later, "is to be found not in the various
anti-Christian asservations and actions of National-Socialism,
but in its anti-Semitism in principle . . . .Here the Christian
Church is attacked at its very root and threatened with death
... .Anti-Semitism is sin against the Holy Spirit. For anti-
Semitism means rejection of the grace of God." '57
That is a remarkably indicative piece of theology; the oc-
casion of Barth's making it should not blur its general impor-
tance for jurisprudence. Barth's basis for prophetic objection
is not that Nazis offended human decency, or natural reason,
55. Herberg, The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth, in K. BARTH, supra
note 26 at 11. Barth sustains this doctrine through a wide discussion of
ethical particulars. See K. BARTH, supra note 23; 11-2 K. BARTH, CHURCH
DOGMATIcS 509-42 (T. & T. Clark ed. 1957).
56. E. BuscH, supra note 25, at 226-43, 257, 261, 273, 358.
57. K. BARTH, supra note 26, at 40.
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or the morals that are written in the hearts of man, and thus
he does not speak as a Lutheran or natural law Roman Cath-
olic would have. The substance of his objection is specifically
religious; he speaks with the Bible open in front of him. He
speaks of the state, to the state; the state is part of, not sepa-
rate from, the Kingdom of Love. There is, he said, "an ac-
tual, and therefore inward and vital, connection between the
two realms . . . in spite of all differences, an inner and vital
connection. . . between. . . the worship of the Church...
and 'political' service of God, a service of God which, in gen-
eral terms, would consist in the careful examination of all
those problems which are raised by the existence of human
justice, of law, or, rather, which would consist in the recogni-
tion, support, defence, and extension of this law - and all of
this not in spite of, but because of, divine justification.""M
The law, in other words, and as Barth put it, is the form of
the Gospel.59 The law is, from the beginning, from before
the creation, promissory. The Incarnation exhibits God's
eternal will: He did not wrestle with Himself; He did not
change His mind. The consequence of such a doctrine, to
take a less stressful example than National Socialism, is that
church and state are separate, if they are, so that the church's
ability to instruct the state will not be corrupted.
Thielicke's disagreement with Barth on these points -
and Thielicke, too, lived through and resisted the Nazi terror
- is that Barth is too near docetism. Barth is too inclined to
minimize the Incarnation as a event in history, as a mighty
miracle. Thielicke said that Luther's position on the separa-
tion of law and Gospel was the only way to preserve a histori-
cal view of the Incarnation. Barth, Thielicke says, would
make of the Incarnation "a ghostly incorporeality." The view
that the Incarnation is an exhibition of God's eternal will
treats the Incarnation as a piece of evidence rather than an
event, which means that the Christian doctrine of salvation
becomes a "divine monologue.""M
This theological dispute has its consequences in the prob-
lem of evil. Both Thielicke (Lutheran) and Barth (Calvinist)
58. Id. at 43-44.
59. See K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 337-38.
60. 1 H. THIELICKE, supra note 34, ch. 7. It might help to notice that
H. Richard Niebuhr, in his slightly playful theory of "theological unitarian-
isms," would likely identify Barth as a God-the-Father unitarian and Lu-
ther and Thielicke as God-the-Son unitarians. The point is that each of
them is gently accused of not facing up to the unity of God. Niebuhr, Theo-
logical Unitarianinns, 40 THEOLOGY TODAY 150 (1983).
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follow ancient precedents in considering the problem of evil,
but they disagree in a way that is fundamentally important
for jurisprudence. Barth's notion (consequent on his view
that the Incarnation is an exhibition of God's will, in which
man becomes elected because God chooses to be rejected) is
that evil is a no-thing. Evil is not created. "The world is no
longer subject to evil," he says. Salvation is complete; history
does not, in any ultimate sense, consist of "events and turn-
ing points and divine resolves."61 Thielicke and the Lutheran
tradition describe evil as having considerably more force. Evil
is real; God uses law in a lawyer's sense to resist evil, ruth-
lessly, with coercion, terror, and punishment. In Luther's ju-
risprudence this use of the law is more prominent than either
conviction of sin or instruction."
There is emphasis in each side of this disagreement that
is important for jurisprudence, or so it seems to me. It seems
to me likely that a Barthian would look upon a lawyer's politi-
cal and professional action as a calling, as a necessity, as mis-
sionary work, and that a Lutheran would not. A Barthian
would, as we say, bear witness to his faith in his legal life and
a Lutheran would not. The point is a point about theory, and
when theory is made explicit, about professional life. Many of
the great, modern reformers have been Lutherans. Dag
Hammarskjold, for example. But they took pains-as a com-
parison of the news of those days with Hammarskjold's Mark-
ings would demonstrate-that their activity in the world was
seen to be secular; they did not proclaim the Good News as
they went about their work . That difference is not merely
one of style; it is theological, and therefore jurisprudential.
At least one of its theological implications will be whether a
lawyer or one who works with the law but is not a lawyer is
able to see his work as what old-fashioned Catholics used to
call an apostolate, being an apostle. The Lutheran theory
here seems to pose an obstacle to doing that-in view of ca-
reers as inspiring as Hammarskjold's was an obstacle that is,
of course, a point not of praise but of theology.
Another way to highlight the differences between the
Lutheran and Calvinist approaches to law and the one-God
question is to raise the persistent difficulty of what "law"
meant to the fathers of the Reformation, none of whom seem
61. Discussed in 1 H. THIMCKE, supra note 34, at 98-117.
62. Alexander, supra note 30.
63. Erling, Discipleship at the United Nations: Hammarskjold's Religious
Commitment, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 902 (1981).
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to have tied law to nature as much as the Thomists did. By
and large, Luther's use of the word law will permit transla-
tion to the civil context, because Luther, by and large, dis-
cusses civil law in terms of its office of prosecution, and very
little in terms of its office of education or political witness."
Calvin's (and Barth's) use of the term often distinguishes
among these three offices and only sometimes equates the
word law, as it appears in scripture, with law in the civil com-
munity." Calvin's use of the word is complex, in other words,
but the complexity is helpful to jurisprudence.
Calvin's view of the Torah is that it was grace; it was not
only a thing of strictures (which is how Luther understood it).
Calvin taught, for example, that St. Paul's use of the word
law was truncated, that St. Paul did not mean law in the full
Judaic sense of the word, but meant an abusive reduction
(perhaps a particular contemporary Pharisaic reduction) of
Jewish law, when Paul said, "Law intruded . . . to multiply
law breaking,""' or "The law was a kind of tutor . . . until
Christ should come." 7 Calvin taught, as Judaism always has,
that Jewish law is grace as well as judgment."
Barth restates this teaching:
"Hearing the command ... means hearing the love in
the command . . . the absolutely primary Yes which God
says to us through the command. If we do not hear this
gracious Yes ... we do not hear the command at all. It is a
theological hardness of heart that sees a lower stage of reli-
gion in the Old Testament because it does not know the ab-
stract differentiation of law and gospel which, even in the
face of the jubilation with which Psalm 119 and other
passages sing about the gift of the law, dares to operate
with the catchword of legalism, or which, according to the
same schema, would find in Calvin's joy in the law a relapse
into Judaism.""
"No one can deny," Calvin said, "that a perfect pattern
64. Finger, supra note 27; Alexander, supra note 30.
65. See supra note 42. Barth's doctrine was that law is subject to the
order of redemption; it, and all of nature, says "that God's goodness is
shown to us, and is made a norm, as a human goodness which is unrestrict-
edly and unhesitatingly opened up and addressed and offered to others."
K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 337-38.
66. Romans 5:20.
67. Galatians 3:24.
68. J. CALVIN, supra note 50; K. BARTH, supra note 23.
69. K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 91.
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of righteousness stands forth in the law." And not only in
command, but also in forgiveness. The law includes God's
promise of grace; in this way it is able to stand against the
despair that would otherwise come from finding God's com-
mand unattainable. This is radically different from Luther's
view that, although God reigns over the state, the state and
its precepts are apart from God's redemptive action. Luther
even said once, "Christ does not participate in this secular
kingdom. God - and not Christ - institutes it."'70
Calvin associates civil law to his view that both Torah
and Gospel are sources of grace, thus, all three sources of law
- nature, Torah, and Gospel-are sources of grace and in
that sense (at least sometimes) use of the word law includes all
three sources. Calvin saw the law as used by God in three
ways: to convict of sin, to achieve order, and to instruct. He
speaks of civil authority as a means of divine help: "The help
of the magistrate is a holy gift of God." This runs both ways,
from God to civil law and back again. There is grace in civil
law; God acts there. And Torah contains "the basis of all so-
cial order. For when we discuss any one of the Command-
ments," Calvin argues "we need not restrict ourselves to its
bare working, but must search for the deeper purpose behind
it." Calvin taught, as Roman Catholicism has, that the com-
mandment to obey and respect parents is, as well, a com-
mandment to obey and respect the government.71 That raises
difficulties, of course, when one comes to unjust law and
questions of civil disobedience, but the difficulties are the
product of a high, theological view of what ordinary law -
law in the lawyer's sense of law - is. Such a view makes it
possible for a lawyer to see his work as an apostolate.
B. Outside Modern Mainline Theology
There are two other traditions on this one-God issue that
are important to theology and to jurisprudence. One of these
has to do with the Anabaptists; the other has to do with what
has come to be called liberation theology.
70. P. ALTHAUS, THE ETHicS OF MARTIN LTmrai 46 (1972). Finger
says that Luther's doctrine in this regard "sanctioned and hastened the
process of secularization whereby so many areas of life - government, sci-
ence, economics, law - were emancipated from the control of the church.
Politicians, scientists, merchants, lawyers - all were allowed to explore
their fields of activity and conduct them on basis of reason freed from reli-
gion's control." Finger, supra note 27, at 74.
71. Finger, supra note 27, at 75-83; Alexander, supra note 30.
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Liberation Theology. The theology of hope, or political
theology, or liberation theology - it attracts all of these la-
bels - has grown out of recent work by a wide spectrum of
modern Christian theologians, from Jurgen Moltmann,
whose tradition is Calvinist;72 to Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peru-
vian Roman Catholic pastor;78 to Johann Metz, also a Catho-
lic; to Miguez Bonino, an Argentinian Methodist clergyman,
trained in the U.S., who is at the moment one of the presi-
dents of the World Council of Churches. 4 These thinkers
are Barthians in the sense that they see the political process
as under the order of redemption and see God's presence in
the world as promissory. But they, like Judaism, place a much
more radical emphasis on the theological significance of the
future than Barth's ethic does. They see social justice (what
the philosophers call distributive justice) as central to the be-
havior of believers in the world, rather than grace - or, to
put that more carefully, they see justice as grace, and grace as
justice. "Justice," Bonino says, "is the only acceptable ground
for social order."75 The social order he is talking about is a
one-kingdom social order; it is the product of grace working
in the lives of those who struggle for social justice. This em-
phasis on unity, on behavior (act), and on the future, is, again,
Judaic."
Liberation theology shares with Anabaptist theology an
emphasis on the world as an inhumane, suffering place, and
on the faith that God is in the world as it suffers; He is suffer-
ing with it. Both are theologies of Job, theologies of the
Cross, theologies of the poor.7 "Christ," Moltmann says, "is
Lord not only of renewed hearts but of the whole world.17 8
Douglas Sturm, in his survey of the liberation theolo-
gians, suggests that their position turns on four proposi-
72. Volf, Communities of Faith and Radical Discipleship: An Interview
with Jurgen Moltmann, 100 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 246 (1983).
73. Brockman, The Prophetic Role of the Church in Latin America: A
Conversation with Gustavo Gutierrez, 100 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 931
(1983); Gutierrez, Theology and Spirituality in a Latin American Context,
HARVARD DIVINITY BULLETIN, Aug. 1984, at 4; Gutierrez's doctrine is in G.
GUTIERREZ, THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION (1973).
74. Sturm, A Liberationist on Ethics, 43 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 289
(1983); Sturm analyzes liberation theology in careful detail in Praxis and
Promise: On the Ethics of Political Theology, 98 ETHIcS 733 (1982).
75. Sturm, A Liberationist on Ethics, supra note 74.
76. M. BUBER, ON JUDAISM (1967).
77. J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972).
78. Volf, supra note 72.
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tions:7 First, the character of the moral agent, the person, is
political. The person cannot be separated from the political
order(s) in which he lives. Theology cannot be separated
from politics. The moral agenda for a believer is to notice
that the world is inhumane and to seek to transform it. At
the very least it is the believer's business to remove himself
from the company of those who impose inhumanity on other
people. Scripture has authority in this process, but like every-
thing else, scripture is read in a political context. "It is always
in the political fabric - and never outside of it - that a
person emerges as a free and responsible being, as a person
in relationship with other people, as someone who takes on
an historical task," Gutierrez says.
Second, the ground of moral judgment (and, I think, of
jurisprudential judgment) is God as promise. Not God in na-
ture, but God in history. Metz talks about the modern era,
one that has been (as liberal Protestant theology has been)
dependent theoretically on Kant, as an era of "hominiza-
tion," of making man the measure of all things. But that de-
velopment, he says, has resulted not in a more humanistic
world, not in liberty, but in the subjection and the oppression
of the poor. The Hebraic task in such a world is to take the
side of the poor, and to recognize that the institutions around
us continue to be subject to power; they are the results of
power. As Sturm puts it, "Over against the traditional Refor-
mation doctrines of foreordained orders of creation and vo-
cation, Moltmann [for example] argues that institutions are
elastic and malleable, that social roles should be transformed
to accord with the promises of the kingdom of God, and that
to be a moral subject is to be a political agent engaged in that
process." As the civil rights slogan used to have it, "If you're
not part of the solution you're part of the problem."
Third, the central moral and jurisprudential problem of
the modern age is dependency,. powerlessness. The challenge,
Bonino says, is "discerning actual historical possibilities and
determining which among them matches most closely Christi-
anity's commitment to the poor. . . . Christianity in its most
primitive impulse is a religion of the underdog." That is a
political agenda; a jurisprudence built on such a theology
would be a tendentious, biased jurisprudence." This is neces-
79. Sturm, A Liberationist on Ethics, supra note 74.
80. Robert E. Rodes is developing a jurisprudence based on libera-
tion theology, particularly that of Gutierrez. See R. RODES, supra note 12
and accompanying text. See also R. Rodes, Liberation Jurisprudence (un-
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sarily so because, as Gutierrez teaches, the God of Jews and
Christians is a God encountered in history, among the poor.
In this political sense, Moltmann sees God as future; He is
present among us as promise. Moltmann has developed a the-
ory of negative dialectic in which the evil in the world testi-
fies to God's presence, because in noticing the absence of
God we understand His presence as promise. Thus, he says,
the Cross (and, I think, the presence in history of suffering
Israel) is the presence of God in the condition of the world as
it is now. Thus he calls his theology a theology of hope. When
he published in English a book called The Theology of Hope, in
1964, his American friends criticized him for the title and
pointed in sadness to their country's military involvement in
Viet Nam. "I promised," Moltmann says, "that when I came
back to the United States I would speak no more about hope,
but only about the Cross." In 1974 he published in English a
book called The Crucified God.61 In such a negative dialectic,
to talk of God is to talk of the possibility of change. The
forms of the liberation of the poor are, to Moltmann, like
sacraments.
Fourth, the ultimate purpose of the moral life is commu-
nity. Liberation theology fields much of its theory in confer-
ences of bishops, in meetings of the World Council, and in
academic and political statements of consensus. Like Judaism,
it is communitarian in theory and in method. 2 Its ethic is
relational, not individualistic as in Kant or in much of Ameri-
can evangelicalism. As a theology of liberation, it aims to win
for the powerless a place of human agency in the community,
and thus to deliver both the oppressed and the oppressor
from a condition of inhumanity. Its doctrine of the church is
a doctrine of friendship; Jesus, Moltmann says, is better seen
as friend than in the traditional images of prophet, priest,
and king. Gutierrez says that the essence of evil is the breach
of friendship.
Anabaptists. The jurisprudence of the prominent and ar-
published manuscript).
81. Volf, supra note 72.
82. "In genuine Judaism ethics and faith are not separate spheres;
its ideal, holiness, is true community with God and true community with
human beings, both in one .... The religious character of the people
consists emphatically in that something different is intended for it from
what it is now, that it is destined for something different - that it should
become a true people, the 'people of God.'" M. BUBER, supra note 76, at
111, 207.
19841
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
ticulate Mennonite theologian, John Howard Yoder,"8 if he
were to write one, might be subtitled "the possibilities of law
for peace." Yoder's theology - which, so far as I can tell, is
solidly within the Anabaptist or (as the professional theolo-
gians say it) Sectarian tradition" - is that Jesus had a coher-
ent, purposeful, political and legal agenda and that this
agenda is apparent, if hard to take, in the Gospel, and partic-
ularly (for Yoder) in the Gospel of Luke. Anabaptist theology
confronts the modern, mainline American Protestant no-
tion 5 that Jesus was indifferent to political order.
Jesus taught that the Kingdom of God had come. Jesus
brought a political order with him. That political order re-
jected violence ("the compulsiveness of purpose that leads
men to violate the dignity of others""), confronted evil, and
was open to the action of God in overcoming evil through
suffering - the suffering of the individual believer, the suf-
fering of God's people (as in the traditional Jewish reading of
Isaiah 53), and the suffering of God Himself. Yoder's theol-
ogy in a phrase is that "the Kingdom is the Cross." He says,
"The alternative to how the kings of the earth rule is not
'spirituality' but servanthood", s
The Gospel is therefore not so much prophetic as it is
simply apart. The Gospel is neither within centers of power,
as Barth would say, as Nathan was prophetic within the politi-
cal center of David's kingdom, nor in tension with them as
Luther would say. Christians live apart from a community
that resolves its disputes with force, apart from a political and
legal order that rests on coercion rather than servanthood.
The realm of coercive power is not a kingdom as in Luther,
but is more like Moltmann's notion of negative presence.
This teaching has had prominence in American peace-church
withdrawal from secular institutions that use force, but it also
comprehends and forbids use of force within and by the
church."
83. J. YODER, supra note 77; J. Yoder, The Basis of Barth's Social
Ethics (1978) (unpublished manuscript); Yoder, The Hermeneutics of Pe-
oplehood: A Protestant Perspective on Practical Moral Reasoning, 10 J. REL. ETH-
icS 40 (1982).
84. Finger, supra note 27.
85. See, e.g., 0. CULLMAN, supra note 11, at 88-91.
86. J. YODER, supra note 77, at 244.
87. Id. at 46 (citing Luke 22:25); see also Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Servanthood, 8 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE 34(1982).
88. Yoder, The Hermenuetics of Peoplehood, supra note 83.
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An appropriate jurisprudential question, then, is what
sort of community the community-apart (the church) should
be. What should its character be? This is a key jurisprudential
point, since it probably will not happen that the Jew or Chris-
tian apart will take a central role in the deliberations of a
power-dominated civil and legal society. The Jew and Chris-
tian apart does take a central role in the deliberations of the
society of non-violent witness, though. And, so, the character
of the society-apart would likely be a central concern in Ana-
baptist jurisprudence. (There are ancient and recent parallels
in Judaism.") Because Christians must decide on the charac-
ter of the church from their collective understanding of what
the kingdom of God is, they will not necessarily either seek
answers from the broader community, or seek to provide an-
swers to it. They will not, though, refuse to participate in the
life of the larger community; they will rather pick and
choose.' 0 In any case, and in every case, they will not take
responsibility for what the larger community achieves, or ap-
pears to achieve through coercion.
A mundane ethical consequence of this theology is a se-
ries of questions about tasks and roles. What can a member
of the society-apart do in the broader community? Can he, for
example, be a lawyer? Maybe. A judge? Maybe not. A soldier?
No. A policeman? Probably not. These answers about tasks
and roles may vary depending on how much the believer is
able to define what his task is. The Anabaptists would not
follow Luther into allowing the task to define its own moral-
ity.' 1 A believer might, for example, decide that she or he
can be a lawyer because lawyers have control over what they
do as lawyers, but he could not be a lawyer if the consequence
of that vocational choice were a commitment to the Ameri-
can adversary ethic or an acceptance of violence as an instru-
ment of statecraft.
Yoder has accepted that it is important for him to re-
89. See, e.g., 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; M. BuBER, supra note 76.
90. "[O]ne would begin from Christ's vision of corporate existence,
and then search for analogies and partial realizations in public law. One
would also have to assume that the way of Christ might occasionally-and
perhaps frequently-come into conflict with current legal norms and prac-
tices. At such points, Christians guided by an Anabaptist orientation would
have to become very critical of, or refuse to participate in, certain legal
activities. Perhaps they would find their opportunity to function in the rec-
ognized legal system sharply curtailed or even wholly denied." Finger,
supra note 27, at 91.
91. See Shaffer, supra note 17, at 24-27.
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spond to the demand that his Anabaptist theology be univer-
sal. The Judaic tradition is that Israel is chosen by God for
the welfare of all mankind. (God made a covenant, after the
flood, with all mankind, and then He made a covenant with
Abraham.") The mainline Christian tradition has seen the
evangelistic mission of the church as the central reason for
there being a church. In each case such preference in God's
eyes as believers enjoy is explained with a universal divine
purpose. The chosen are God's instruments. All men are the
objects of His love. What is the Anabaptist answer to this
need for universal significance, from a tradition that sees the
church as a society-apart, a society that does not try so much
to change the world as to bear witness in the world to the
Kingdom of God? This is a one-God question; the choices
seem to be between a God Who is for some but not all peo-
ple, or two gods, one for the chosen and one for everybody
else. This is how Yoder speaks to this question of
universalism:
[Tihere are really two kinds of [Christian] universalism.
One affirms the adequacy of the religious expression of al-
most everyone or at least of people in almost every condi-
tion, sometimes in other religions or perhaps in no religion,
because of some inherent human qualities for which one
considers the label "Christ" to be a symbol. This would ap-
ply to. . . inclusive ways of thinking today about salvation
beyond the bounds of the church. This vision is at home in
the inclusivistic reflexes of the mainstream of Christendom,
which even when the church has lost positions and privi-
leges still wants to be taking responsibility for and giving
meaning to the cultural mainstream.
The other kind of incipient universalism is that of the
confessing minority whose commitment to her Lord, de-
spite its being against the stream, is so convinced of the
majesty of His Lordship that she risks trusting that His
power and goodness can reach beyond the number of those
who know Him by his right name. The former universalism
is a high view of the human; the latter a high view of
Jesus.' 3
92. 1. EPSTEIN, supra note 22; W. DAvIs supra note 20, ch. 6.
93. J. Yoder, The Basis of Barth's Social Ethics, supra note 84. One
could make a parallel point about Judaism, in reference perhaps to what a
biographer called Louis D. Brandeis's "peculiarly Jewish zeal for social jus-
tice." A. VORSPAN, Louis D. Brandeis, in GIArs OF JusIcE (1961).
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Anabaptists have not traditionally given attention to civil
law, probably because they have so often been the victims of
its oppression. But a jurisprudence is possible in Anabaptism,
and would be unique. Such a jurisprudence will not be exclu-
sively a jurisprudence of the "confessing minority," because
it is important to find with the broader community the pos-
sibilities for peace that are in the broader community's law.
This latter importance is no doubt recognized as well by the
liberation theologians, and in the Calvinist tradition; it seems
to me more problematical in the Lutheran tradition, particu-
larly if the "peace" one is talking about is a biblical notion.
Nonetheless, the heart of Anabaptist jurisprudence, the es-
sential theory of it, will be found in what it will say about
what the society-apart, the "confessing minority," is to be
and how it is to conduct its law and its polity."
In a meditation on I Cor. 14:26, 29, and on the Refor-
mation, Yoder argues that the early Reformation church
sought to be a place of non-coercive practical moral reason-
ing-in some important senses a place of jurisprudence. This
vision was largely lost by the tendency of Reformation
churches to turn their polity over to governments, that is, to
coercive power. The early form preserved individuality, be-
cause it was voluntary; its method was conversational, not ju-
ridical. 9" It aimed at reconciliation, not judgment, and was
"ratified in heaven" - a biblical claim that it made and that
Yoder makes for it. In this meditation, Yoder focuses on law
as process - "not how ideas work but how the community
works." The loss was in turning this process over to coercion;
an Anabaptist jurisprudence would, I think, aim at redeem-
ing the conversation."
It is important, finally, to understand that the Anabaptist
tradition puts special emphasis on the faith that the God of
the Hebrews is the Ruler of the universe. The position Ana-
baptism describes is not a position of weakness, but is a posi-
tion backed by all possible authority and all possible power.
94. The influential moral theologian Stanley Hauerwas has turned
his attention to this issue in his last two books, A COMMUNITY OF CHARAC-
TER (1981) and THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM (1983).
95. Cf Matthew 18:15-18 (admonition to fraternal correction).
96. Yoder, The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood, supra note 83. The paral-
lel in Judaism is the teaching that controversy "for the sake of heaven is
destined to result in something permanent." The test is sincerity. ETmICS
OF THE FATHERS 5, 20, quoted in DAILY PRAYER Boox 478, 520 (P. Birn-
baum ed. 1977). Cf M. BuBER, supra note 32.
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Anabaptism says with Judaism (in Buber's reading"7 ), "there
is really only one Power," one God. Jesus, Walter Raus-
chenbusch says, "wielded no sword but the truth. But mark
well, that truth was a sword in his hands and not a yard-stick.
It cut into the very marrow of his generation. It was mighty
to the casting down of strongholds. So it has proved itself
whenever it has been in dead earnest. It reveals lies and their
true nature . . . . It makes injustice quail on its throne,
chafe, sneer, abuse, hurl its spear, tender its goal, and finally
offer to serve as truth's vassal . . . .Whenever Christianity
shows an inclination to use constraint in its own defense or
support, it thereby furnishes presumptive evidence that it has
become a thing of this world, for it finds the means of this
world adapted to its end."' 8
III. THE POSSIBILITY FOR HEBRAIC JURISPRUDENCE
The possibility for Hebraic jurisprudence is a possibility
that turns not on intriguing theological differences, but on a
common insistence that law is radically limited: Law is not
God. "No one or no thing can claim the kind of allegiance
that must be reserved for God alone." Not the state, but not
"the administration of justice" either. Not even the hope that
law can free the oppressed or feed the poor. Not Israel, and
not the church. Not certainty and not conviction. Not even
sincerity: "If God is the sole possessor of all truth, then even
the most inspired attempts to proclaim and communicate that
truth will fall short . . . . And that is a recipe for
cooperation.""
The negative and limiting principles of Deuteronomy
5:6-7 are, as negative, significant for jurisprudence and for
the practice of law. They are themselves recipes for coopera-
tion. The adversary ethic, for example, with what Dean Mur-
ray Schwartz calls its "circumstantial dispensation from
[moral] responsibility" 1 6 is called into question by these He-
braic limits, as an instance either of the idolatry of the state
which can require that its minions in the legal profession be
immoral, or as an instance of the division of God into two
97. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1.
98. W. Rauschenbusch, quoted in S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNrrY OF
CHARACTER 46 (1981).
99. Brown, Luther's Fifth Centennial: The Reformer, Seen in a New Per-
spective, 43 CHRISTIANrrY AND CRIsIs 349 (1983).
100. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RFs. J. 953.
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gods, one of whom rules life at home while the other rules
life in town. These Hebraic limits are significant for profes-
sional traditions, such as American legal ethics, that say the
practitioner's moral teacher is the profession itself,10 1 or the
social and economic class from which professional people are
chosen.10 Hebraic jurisprudence, on its negative premises
alone, is at odds with American civil religion and with the
American legal profession's long-standing penchant for put-
ting our law into a temple, for referring to lawyers as priests
at a statist altar.103
But the strength of these limiting principles raises an ec-
umenical question, a question for believers, on the possibility
of learning from one another. Is there a common, positive di-
rection in the Hebraic tradition - a direction strong enough
to sustain a conversation in which all of the intriguing differ-
ences among Jews, Thomists, Lutherans, Calvinists, Anabap-
tists, and Liberationists can be aired, compared, and enriched
for the sake of heaven? Is the common and the positive deep
enough and broad enough to sustain that sort of ecumenical
conversation? Might these theologies share enough to make
worthwhile the pain involved in being truthful about their
differences? I think so. I see four themes as not only distinc-
tive in jurisprudence, but also as positive, common, and
strong.
First, law as itself a tradition. If law is seen as an instru-
ment of statecraft, or as a consequence of political, social,
and religious revolution, the most interesting thing to study
will be politics or social history or religion, not law. Law will
always be a sign that points to something else, something
more important. If law is seen as itself an instrument of God
- as the Reformation Fathers saw it when they argued over
the uses (God's uses) of law10' - it will be defined as itself an
organic tradition. It will then not be something else, not the
voice of the sovereign; it will have a voice of its own. Profes-
sor Harold Berman's scholarship on the law of revolutions, 0'
101. See, e.g., Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics (1854).
102. P. MASON, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN
IDEAL 144-52 (1982).
103. See, e.g., 2 D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 720 (2d ed.
1836).
104. Finger, supra note 27; Alexander, supra note 30.
105. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTnON: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983), and subsequent volumes in process;
Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the West, 1 J. LAW & RELIGION 3
(1983); Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894
19841
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
as well as his work and the work of other scholars on the
interaction of law and religion,'" points to the possibility
that law, all across the Hebraic spectrum, has a voice of its
own. It is, I hope, not an exaggeration to say that Berman
opposes the law-as-politics arguments of the Critical Legal
Studies movement with the view that law is theology. For ex-
ample, he relates the developing notion of legal judgment in
the law of European cultures to eschatology, as he relates the
origins of European jurisprudence to St. Anselm's doctrine of
the Atonement. If law is a cultural tradition that forms and
survives revolutions and upheavals and reformations, then a
jurisprudence is possible that is as culturally broad as any-
thing people can study. There is theology in it, at its core,
theology that comes to light in the study of law as in no other
way.
I had useful advice, as I prepared this essay, to the effect
that a person's view of law is likely to depend on his view of
God; Berman might suggest that it would be useful to state
that the other way around, just to see how the conversation
would go.
The historical office of Hebraic tradition in the law is,
here, a paradox. Professor Haym Soloveitchik has shown
how, in medieval European Judaism, law operated to disci-
pline the community - so that those who interpreted the
Torah to Jewish communities were most severe when the
communities were lax in practice, and most accommodating
to custom when the communities were pious. "The ironic re-
sult of such a mentality is that a community which seeks al-
lowances will not receive them from the Halachist . . . . But
a culture which . . . seeks a thickening of the divine yoke
. . . will often receive allowances with alacrity." 1" That cul-
tural experience with law, which has parallels in, say, the
American Revival and in both the medieval church and the
Reformation church, would justify the way I fancy Berman
might ask the question about views of God and views of law.
Understanding law as organic in a culture makes it possi-
ble to think of a dialogue between the community's law and
the community's self-image. Thus, for example, law explains
(1977).
106. H. BERMAN, INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); Sympo-
sium: The Secularization of the Law, 31 MERCER L. REV. 395-558 (1980); 1 J.
LAW & RELIGION nos. 1 and 2 (1984).
107. A Jewish Conception of Law, lecture by Haym Soloveitchik to the
Section on Law and Religion, Association of American Law Schools (Dec.
1978).
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the myth, particularly prevalent in times of crises, of the re-
turn to a former time: "Society moves inevitably into the fu-
ture. But it does so by walking backwards."' " When a com-
munity is most in crisis, it most needs a coherent ethos from
its past, and least needs the largely procedural notions of jus-
tice that support American pluralism.10' The Hebraic tradi-
tions contain in common such a coherent ethos. This shared
ethos is part of the culture; indeed, Berman argues, it is part
of the law.
Second, law as substance. Biographers attribute the effec-
tiveness of Justice Louis D. Brandeis to the peculiarly Jewish
zeal for social justice.1 01 "Wrongs committed by man against
God can be atoned for on the Day of Atonement, but trans-
gressions by man against man can be forgiven only when the
injustice is remedied," Rabbi Isaac Wise said. "Belief in God
is significant for the Jew only as that belief is transmuted into
righteous action . . . . Judaism is essentially a summons to
social action." 11 Such a spirit is deep, too, in the Christian
traditions, even in those that get least credit for it. The
American lawyer-evangelist Charles Grandison Finney, for
example, directed his lieutenants to examine the converts
who responded to his sermons. It was important to him that
these converts' views on slavery be consistent with Christian-
ity.11' The social gospel was more prominent throughout the
waves of fundamentalist religious fervor in the nineteenth
century United States than it is usually given credit for be-
ing 1 1 Principles of social justice in the Roman Catholic tra-
dition had been clearly restated for the modern industrial
West long before the Russian Revolution.1 ' The religious
ethics of such twentieth century Protestant teachers as Karl
Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer were
available before liberation theology came along. This cen-
tury's obvious need for correctives in religious life are
108. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 41 (1983).
109. Neuhaus, Law and the Limits of Pluralism, 5 CHRISTIAN LEGAL
Soc'y Q. 14 (1984). I make somewhat the same argument in my essay on
the small-town Southern lawyer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 UNI-
VFRSITY OF PITrSBURGH LAW REVIEW 181 (1981).
110. A. VORSPAN, supra note 93.
111. Id. at 249-50.
112. V. EDMAN, FINNEY LIVES ON (1951); see also T. SHAFFER, ON BE-
ING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 75, 237 (1981).
113. T. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM IN MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1958).
114. 2 R. MCBRIEN, supra note 5, at 641-55.
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prompted less by failures in religious social ethics than by
failures in practice, particularly political and professional
practice.
The point of saying that the theory was in place when
the practice was not is to show that the social action cele-
brated in Brandeis's life and in Rabbi Wise's teaching rests on
substance, and that the substance is Hebraic, common, and
positive. Such action and teaching does not rest on proce-
dural notions of equality and fairness, nor on Enlightenment
notions of natural right. It does not rest on standard Ameri-
can jurisprudence but, rather, on a long history of giving
transcendent value to human relationships, on the belief that
the other person is a child of God. 1 ' These notions are cen-
tral in the Hebraic traditions, and they are specifically legal.
In Judaism, for example, law is life; the blessing that is spo-
ken over the Torah scroll in a public worship service in the
synagogue says, "Blessed are You 0 Lord Our God . . .Who
in giving us a Torah of truth has planted everlasting life
within us.""" Similar claims are made by the evangelists for
the ethical teachings of Jesus: "I have come that you might
have life ..
Speaking of theological, biblical, substance as legal has
an ecumenical advantage over ecumenical enterprises that
deal with grace and salvation. The common thread in juris-
prudence is an assurance of the triumph of righteousness,
rather than a view of salvation. It is useful, of course, to have
ecumenical conversations on faith and works and other, as
the Christian theologians call them, soteriological issues. But
those discussions carry old and new denominational baggage,
much more so, I think, than propositions within each stream
115. Barth's teaching on this point can be common and positive, I
think: "In the people of God, there can no more be mere objects of right
than there can be mere objects of education. God's honor wills to dwell
among his people. For each individual this means submission and orienta-
tion to the neighbor, the orientation being no less a command than the
submission. I cannot will only that right come to me..A purely passive rela-
tion to right is a sure sign that I have not yet thought of the concept of
right as that of necessary conflict between the public order of life and my
private order. . . .As the true object of right, one will necessarily become
its bearer, the bearer of the social order with all that is to be said for and
against this." K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 386. See also Forer, McLennan &
Shaffer, Some Problems in the Administration of Justice in a Secularized Society,
31 MERCER L. REV. 459-66; T. SHAFFER, supra note 112, at 135-42 (discus-
sions of justice as gift).
116. DAILY PRAYER BooK 370 (P. Birnbaum ed. 1977); see ETHICS OF
THE FATHERS, supra note 49.
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of the Hebraic tradition that speak to action as consequent
on faith and provide guidance to action. That action as spe-
cific to the religious tradition will show up mostly, I think, in
a prophetic criticism of the state and in an Hebraic under-
standing of peace in a lawful community.
Third, law as (therefore) prophetic. When it is seen to be
organic and substantive, law has the ability - in fact, the im-
perative - to criticize politics, not in terms of a political tra-
dition (as, say, in appeals to the American Founding Fathers),
but in terms of what Berman calls the legal tradition (as, say,
in appeals to justice as righteousness, or in the melancholy
fact of history that collectivities destroy people). In this re-
gard, Martin Buber, Hebrew prophet that he was, urged
upon modern Israel the distinction between state and com-
munity, and then claimed for the prophet the ability and
freedom to criticize the community. He spoke of the commu-
nity not as a society but as a practice, a practice "for the sake
of a common covenant . . . to practice in actual living the
community between being and being, person and person, to-
ward which end creation was created. . . to preserve direct-
ness in a world which is becoming more and more indirect, in
the face of self-righteousness of collectivities to preserve the
mystery of relationship, without which a people must perish
in icy death."11 Buber was talking, as the Jewish tradition
often talks, of law as a conversation with God. The sequence
of his reasoning was that the conversation with God is carried
out in relationships among people - law as a conversation
among people in community; that the community in its cove-
nant with God serves such relationships; and that the commu-
nity is therefore in opposition to the political collectivity. The
community is prophetic: "The more unrelated individuals
are," Buber said elsewhere, "the more consolidated the State
becomes, and vice versa."' 1 8 Such reflections lead, I think, to
an understanding of law and the practice of law as devices for
holding the collective in check - law against order, in
Charles Morgan's phrase.119 This practice is carried out when
law operates prophetically in the community, preventing the
community from demanding group loyalties when it should
be fostering personal loyalties. "A society can be termed
117. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 163.
118. M. BUBER, THE UNDSCOVERED SELF 25-26 (1957), quoted in Fried-
man, Introduction to M. BuBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN (1965).
119. Quoted in Powledge, Something for a Lawyer to Do, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 25, 1969, at 63.
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human," Buber said, "in the measure to which its members
confirm one another.912 0
All of that Buberian personalism is an example of law.
being prophetic. There are no doubt other examples, many
of them available through jurisprudential reflection on liber-
ation theology. The limiting emphasis that Buber and his un-
derstanding of the Hebraic tradition (he had a deep under-
standing of the Christian traditions as well as of his own
Judaism) will bring to any such example is that the twentieth
century's reliance on the state as a source of goodness is mis-
placed - is, in a word, idolatry. The Hebrew prophet stands
ready to say of any modern state what Buber said of ancient
Rome - "a forced union that had supplanted all natural
community; it was legitimized arbitrariness, sanctioned sacri-
lege, a mechanism wearing the mask of an organism, an or-
ganism wearing the mask of the spirit . . . a contraction of a
strayed will to community. 1.. A positive and common He-
braic emphasis requires in addition to such prophetic denun-
ciation an understanding of the difference between state and
community and, then, an understanding of the office of law
as something that can operate positively within and some-
times against the community. "It is impossible," Buber said,
"to make an idol of the people as a whole [if] the religious
attitude to the community is inherently critical and postula-
tive." 1 2 Israel is the biblical example; Israel has always been
called to righteousness, to what it is to become.
This prophetic witness in and through law is not an ex-
periment; if it is faithful, the Hebraic traditions teach, the
prophetic witness claims the promises of God. It has a reli-
gious claim to make, both in the substance of what it says and
in the authority with which it speaks. It is as law a matter of
120. M. BUBER, KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 67 (1965).
121. M. BUBER, supra note 76, at 124-25.
122. Id. at 207. The argument depends on a familiar distinction be-
tween nation and state - see, e.g., J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE
(1951) - but also on a political theology that centers in the community,
the nation, that subordinates the state to the community. Buber's com-
plaints about political activity in Israel frequently made use of the Jewish
tradition in this regard. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1. Barth states the
point in Christian theological terms: "The ethical relevance of nationality
is that we must meet God in this reality and not another, that in this re-
spect. . .God will find us where he has put us. It has nothing whatever to
do with mutual boasting. Concretely it simply means loyalty to the way of
my people .. .not because they are ...assigned in the first instance to
me too. Nationhood (like family) is a framework for my action as obedient
action.'! K. BARTH, supra note 23, at 192-93.
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truth, though, not of power. (Buber says the eternal types in
Judaism are the priest seeking power and the prophet seeking
truth. ')
Hebraic jurisprudence will not talk, as standard jurispru-
dence does, of compromise, nor of utilitarian gain, nor inter-
est balancing, nor costs and benefits: "God is the guarantor
that moral striving is not pointless, that persistent moral en-
deavor can really prevail over the inevitable opposition it en-
counters and the inescapable moral weakness and despair we
experience. Indeed, if rational individuals engage in religious
reflection in the first place, and if they seek to ground the
dictates of their own consciences in a source beyond the
human, it is because they recognize that practical reason can-
not fully justify its own authority before the corrosive testi-
mony of ordinary experience. Belief in God is a way of pro-
tecting conscience from reason's own assaults."'' The
promises of God are not, of course, an assurance of effective-
ness; one can hardly reflect on the hatred in Christianity, or
on the suffering of Israel, and conclude that God promises
success. Buber taught, with irony but also persuasively, that
God fulfills his purposes not by power but by spirit, through a
secret leadership that works through failure rather than suc-
cess. This is the meaning of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah:
"The way, the real way, from the Creation to the Kingdom is
trod not on the surface of success, but in the deep of failure.
The real work from the biblical point of view, is the late-re-
corded, the anonymous. The real work is done in the
shadow, in the quiver.' 25
Much of this work is, I think, in the law, but it will be a
mistake for movements in Hebraic jurisprudence to situate
study in church-state issues, to the neglect of issues having to
do with lawyer-client relationships. That mistake would be to
let the state set the agenda; it would resemble the tendency
to let law dominate Gospel that Barth complained of in the
Lutheran tradition. As justice is a gift people give to one an-
other, and not something citizens get from the state, peace
under law rests on benevolence more than it rests on order.
Thousands of promises are made and kept for every lawsuit
that is litigated or settled under the law of contract. The raw
material for this emphasis in Hebraic jurisprudence will be
123. M. BUBER, supra note 76, at 88.
124. Green, Abraham, Isaac, and the Jewish Tradition: An Ethical Reap-
praisal, 10 J. REL. Emics 1 (1982).
125. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 88.
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the law office, the lawyer's life as counselor and planner, and
collective efforts - many in religious congregations - to
provide forums for the resolutions of disputes that are scrip-
tural in their disdain for the courts and sacramental in their
determination to reconcile the faithful to one another, to
honor and preserve a unity in the community that the state,
at its best, can only respect and protect, never provide.
Fourth, law as a way of peace. The Hebraic traditions
know what peace is; they hold in common a view of what
peace is. In their shared knowledge they can, I think, talk
about law as a way to peace. Cullman's account of Jesus's view
of the state is useful on this point: The state is not to be re-
sisted with force, but it is not righteous, either. 2 Hebraic
commonality here, I think, has two distinct features - a the-
ory of servanthood rather than of service, and an insistence
on the central importance of forgiveness. On the one hand,
as Rabbi Hillel said, "My abasement is my exaltation, and my
exaltation is my abasement."1 7 On the other, the emphasis
in the Hebraic tradition is on God's triumph over evil: "To
believe that evil is incapable of redemption and to perma-
nently exclude the evildoer from the kingdom of God is to
divide the world forevermore between God and Satan ....
God's exiled glory . . . dwells in all places . . . and it can be
served wherever it is met."""u But, as Buber's Yehudi, a pro-
fessional person, said, "It takes a long time before a man gets
to understand what his duty is. It is the duties that prevent
him from doing so.''12
126. 0. CULLMAN, supra note 11.
127. Circa 20 B.C.E.; quoted in J. JEREmIAS, THE PARABLES OF JESUS
192 (S.H. Hooke trans., 2d rev. ed. 1972).
128. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 315. Despite the pessimism of
the most comprehensive report on them, it is possible that contemporary
movements in theologically-based reconciliation of disputes provide a form
and a forum for the practice of law according to the jurisprudence I mean
to suggest. C. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW (1983). See L. BUZZARD &
L. ECK, TELL IT TO THE CHURCH (1982), and the dozens of sources cited by
Auerbach on Jewish courts of reconciliation in the United States and
Canada.
129. M. BUBER, supra note 32, at 85.
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